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SI: Culture Digitally
Introduction: A Moment for Hate
Given the context of vitriolic online misogyny so starkly 
illustrated in the ongoing #GamerGate campaign, it seems 
that iterations of hate speech have become endemic to much 
online discourse. Earlier, more optimistic pronouncements 
of the Internet’s ability to offer spaces for productive and 
democratic interactivity seem at best naive in what can be 
framed as the current ascendancy of online hate. This is 
reflected in the string of prosecutions since 2012 for online 
hate speech in the United Kingdom that reflect distinct legis-
lative frameworks being developed for online as opposed to 
offline speech (Rustin, 2014). While we may be experienc-
ing something of a “moment” for hate speech online, taking 
a more historical perspective to networked communication 
shows that this kind of online hate, including a wide range of 
behaviors from flaming to trolling to cyberbullying, may 
also be characteristic and perhaps constitutive of online cul-
ture (Jane, 2014b).
In looking for precedents of online hate speech in earlier 
Internet spaces as well as mediated communication more 
generally, we point toward longstanding issues of exclusion 
and inequality in public speech. To trace the shifting borders 
of inclusion and exclusion that subtend the ebbs and flows of 
particular moments for hate discourses in specific political 
contexts offers an inroad into thinking historically about the 
affordances of various online spaces as platforms (Gillespie, 
2010). Here, special emphasis is placed on the ontological 
status of social media as the primary mode through which 
hate is currently expressed. For example, viewing online 
hate as a kind of performance invites analysis of how such 
performative acts interface with the temporal and spatial 
affordances of social media. Part of this entails historical 
interrogation of the “social” in social media, where the com-
munity norms of different sites interact with more top-down 
modes of governance—as in laws that are being formulated 
differently in specific national jurisdictions and in individual 
website terms and conditions. Governance of hate thus hap-
pens in the intersections between policy and community, and 
these intersections themselves develop over time and accord-
ing to specific spatial arrangements. The processes underly-
ing online hate point toward a set of complex issues at the 
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Abstract
This roundtable discussion presents a dialogue between digital culture scholars on the seemingly increased presence of 
hating and hate speech online. Revolving primarily around the recent #GamerGate campaign of intensely misogynistic 
discourse aimed at women in video games, the discussion suggests that the current moment for hate online needs to be 
situated historically. From the perspective of intersecting cultural histories of hate speech, discrimination, and networked 
communication, we interrogate the ontological specificity of online hating before going on to explore potential responses 
to the harmful consequences of hateful speech. Finally, a research agenda for furthering the historical understandings of 
contemporary online hating is suggested in order to address the urgent need for scholarly interventions into the exclusionary 
cultures of networked media.
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center of any normative discussion of regulation and inter-
vention, including the boundaries of free speech, asymme-
tries between more powerful and more marginalized actors, 
the meanings and implications of visibility, and the dynamics 
between online and offline hate.
This roundtable-style discussion article examines such 
topics through a series of prompting questions, answers to 
which are organized dialogically to put ideas into conversa-
tion with each other and build up a collaborative analytical 
approach to a complex problem. Growing from previous 
face-to-face discussions at Culture Digitally’s London meet-
ing in June 2013, the article allows for an extended consider-
ation of online hate as historical process, with a view toward 
setting up a conceptual framework for future research. To 
that end, throughout the discussion, we engage with episte-
mological questions of where to position ourselves as 
researchers in contentious spaces: how we should define 
online hate; how we should document a sprawling and 
uneven set of histories, contextually differing practices, 
speech acts, and norms; how to develop methodologies and 
theoretical orientations that connect micro, meso, and macro 
levels of analysis; how to articulate normative and interven-
tionist concerns; and what is the best way to work with com-
munities and within spaces where hate speech pervades.
Histories and Ontologies of Hate 
Online
The conversation began by establishing a foundation on 
which to theorize online hate, articulating the historical prec-
edents for the communicative practices characterizing 
#GamerGate, and contextualizing hate and harassment 
within the earliest computer-mediated communication (CMC) 
controversies.
Tim Jordan
Is hate more prevalent in Internet- and computer-mediated 
communication in more recent times? Or are there increasing 
numbers of people online and so more who experience hate 
online, making such hate more obvious? This question is not 
meant to trivialize hate online but instead to situate it in order 
to better understand it. For me, the question is posed partly 
because one of the first collections of insight from a cultural 
and sociological perspective into online communication was 
a collection called Flamewars, first published in 1994, when 
the World Wide Web was new (Dery, 1994). And while 
“flaming” may not be quite the same as hating or trolling, it 
often involved both of these and thus poses the analytic ques-
tion of where we might draw lines between them. If the 
exemplar of Dery’s collection is not enough to alert us to the 
history of online hate, trolling, and flaming, then I will rein-
force it with a very brief, personal, and impressionistic set of 
instances and online places in which such practices were 
identified.
In 1978, the proponent of the now well-known “finger” 
command (that would allow users to identify who else was on 
a particular computer system) was vigorously attacked by 
other online users for proposing something that they felt 
transgressed the open nature of the Internet. Also in 1978, off 
of what we now know as the Internet but still via networked 
CMC through bulletin board systems, someone published a 
“guide to flaming on BBS.” Similarly off-Internet but through 
computer networks, the trolling group the “Meowers,” who 
frequented Usenet, helped invent the practice of “crap-flood-
ing” (posting so much irrelevant material to a forum that users 
are unable to use the forum for its stated topic). By the 2000s, 
diverse inflammatory groups began to emerge according with 
the Internet’s spread as a mass medium, from sites like 
SomethingAwful to groups with campaigns like the Gay 
Niggers Association of America (which included some mem-
bers who became famous for being trolls, such as Weev). 
From here, a progression can be constructed that leads into to 
the rise of sites like 4chan and the infamous/b/random board, 
and then to some of the trolling and “lulz” roots of Anonymous, 
and finally to the present day, in which hate online appears in 
episodes of misogyny like #GamerGate or the trolling of 
memorial sites in the United Kingdom that has led to arrests 
and the jailing of trolls.
The point of suggesting that hate, trolling, and flaming 
online have been present as long as we have had CMC is not 
to diminish it or dismiss attention to it. It is rather to ask, how 
should we best approach hate online and what is specific to 
online hating? I offer two brief suggestions for starting to 
answer such questions in relation to evidence and online 
communication.
It is important to develop detailed examinations of how 
hate works online to grasp it, or we miss such things as the 
meaning of “lulz” in online political activism. An exemplar 
here is Whitney Phillips’ work, which focuses on trolls who 
target online memorial sites—on the face of it, conducting 
some of the most offensive online insults imaginable in target-
ing those mourning a death. Rather, Phillips suggests that such 
practices primarily target “grief tourists” who have no connec-
tion to whoever is being mourned and who, like tourists, sim-
ply travel from mourning site to mourning site. There is 
something more complex in this picture than we might expect 
from the simple idea of trolling mourning sites being targeted 
at families and those grieving. Trolling “grief tourists” offers 
instead an action focused on those seen to be already abusing 
memorial sites with insincere grief (Phillips, 2011).
Second, even the earliest experiments in CMC found a 
number of characteristics to such discussions that diverged 
from offline communication. These experiments were con-
ducted pre-Internet to investigate the process of collective deci-
sion-making using computer networks. Researchers found four 
effects in groups making decisions through CMC: people con-
tributed more than when face to face; people spoke more often 
to those further up a hierarchy; decisions were very difficult to 
come to; and, people were much ruder than when face to face 
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(Sproull & Kiesler, 1993). A psychological explanation of this 
has been described the “Online Disinhibition Effect” (Suler, 
2004), but in a more communication studies vein, I think we 
should also explore the relationship between communicative 
practices online and offline. In particular, I feel it is important 
to pay attention to how an identity as a communicative subject 
is created, with online requiring a communicative subject to be 
“heard” before they become able to communicate, whereas in 
offline it is the emitter or author of a message who creates the 
possibility of communicating. If we are concerned with how 
meaning can be sent and received, we need to understand the 
cultures and technologies that constitute a presence in which 
authors and receivers of messages can become stable subject-
positions. Online markers of identity—because they are inher-
ently unstable, unlike the body or timbre of a voice—have to be 
stabilized by being heard consistently; the style of a communi-
cant must be recognizable for communication to be possible. In 
this sense, one must be heard online before one can speak.
If this is the case, then perhaps we can start to differentiate 
online hate speech as an ongoing intensification of online 
communicative practice that seeks to create an identity by 
being heard as a hater. One source of the intensity of online 
hate is this struggle “to be,” to exist as a communicating sub-
ject online, leading to extreme statements to draw the atten-
tion required to exist. However, the subject who comes into 
existence because their style is to flame, troll, and hate will 
then be caught by that identity as they are caught by the style 
they are heard (or read) through. A troll who no longer trolls 
is likely to be considered a different online subject and only 
able to be recognized by others as themselves when they res-
urrect the style of communication that allowed them to be 
heard and so to exist online.
In addition to indicating some of the continuities and dis-
continuities of hating with trolling, flaming, and other online 
practices, the struggle to be through being heard highlights 
the need to consider the ways in which the technologies and 
cultures of social media interpellate particular subject-posi-
tions, normalizing behaviors that would seem inappropriate 
in other contexts. This indicates the challenge of defining 
hate online, given that it is highly contingent on a range of 
factors, as the next contribution highlights.
Tamara Shepherd
I think Tim’s provocation about hating as reflecting an intensi-
fication of certain transgressive subject-positions offers an 
important background for thinking about how hate practices 
are understood more broadly. In previous discussions among 
this group, for example, we have struggled with what to call 
online hate. How do different labels for hate speech online 
implicate different modes of affect, violence, and social exclu-
sion? Looking at popular reactions to online harassment cam-
paigns is one place to start thinking through this question. To 
take #GamerGate as an illustrative case, popular coverage of 
the movement tended to oscillate between dismay at the “hor-
rendous, upsetting and unjustifiable [ . . . ] reams of appalling 
threats and abuse” (Stuart, 2014), and contention that “online 
harassment is as old as the internet itself” (Associated Press, 
2014). The abuse expressed through #GamerGate was in fact 
often dismissed as “trolling,” or “gendertrolling” in the case of 
misogynist threats (Mantilla, 2013).
What does the trolling label enact or perform in the context 
of sexist discourse? Most obviously, it diverts attention away 
from systemic sexism, racism, homophobia, and so on to 
instead dismiss gendered abuse as the practice of a few, 
socially marginal individuals. Part of this diversion has to do 
with the initial use of trolling in the early 1990s to describe 
inflammatory, trickster humor on bulletin board systems 
(Bishop, 2014; Herring, Job-Sluder, Scheckler, & Barab, 
2002). Since that time, however, trolling as a more wide-
spread phenomenon (reflecting broader Internet adoption) 
seems to have become a proxy for hate speech. Here is a case 
where offline forms of social exclusion get amplified when 
combined with more aggressive strands of Internet culture. 
This combination is particularly salient to a discussion of 
online misogyny, as in the case of #GamerGate, since trolls 
are gendered: the origin of the term troll can be traced to US 
military aerial dog-fighting in the 1960s (Jansen & James, 
2002). Today, the transposition of the term within Internet 
communication—perhaps not coincidentally also borne of the 
1960s US military—serves to legitimize sexist and abusive 
behavior, based on amplifying existing social exclusion in 
ways that are not necessarily permitted by the rules of civility 
in similar offline spaces (Filipovic, 2007; Hardaker, 2010).
So when reflecting on the continuities and discontinuities 
that online hate embodies in relation to its earlier, less explic-
itly mediated forms, my instinct gravitates toward the argu-
ment that online sociality masks hate with appeals to play. 
The openness of networked communication infrastructure—
heralded for its support of identity play as well as political 
resistance—also opens up the libertarian opportunity space 
for less progressive “counter publics,” as evident in online 
hate cultures and far-Right movements (Taylor, 2014). Going 
back to #GamerGate as an example, the same hashtag infra-
structure credited with enabling citizen protest in oppressive 
regimes can itself be used oppressively in campaigns of 
misogynist harassment. The form of the hashtag, moreover, 
serves to normalize hate and feed into what has been termed 
an “online misogyny epidemic” (Penny, 2013). In this way, 
trolling as a label not only legitimizes hate speech but also 
conceals the structural supports for gendered exclusion 
through a label that evokes individualized antisocial behav-
iors like bullying, as opposed to culturally endemic expres-
sions of misogyny and sexism.
The power of the term “hate” for discussing the wide 
range of practices that fall under the broader umbrella of 
incivility online serves to highlight the ways in which what 
appears to be an ontologically unique set of activities still 
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serve to marginalize and oppress those least privileged his-
torically and in offline spaces—including women, people of 
color, trans people, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgen-
der (LGBT) people. But as the next example indicates, a 
totalizing label might fail to account for the diversity within 
this wide range of practices.
Kate Miltner
As Tamara mentioned, one of the major problems we have 
when thinking about or engaging with “hate” online is the 
slipperiness of the term and the lack of consistency in the 
way in which it is used.
When dealing with online “hate,” a variety of terms are 
brought into the mix: being a “hater” (haters, after all, 
gonna hate), bullying, trolling, harassment, antagonism, 
hateblogging—the list goes on. The problem is that all of 
these terms represent different phenomena, behaviors, and 
underlying motivations. Being a hater is definitely not the 
same thing as being a troll, and while bullies and trolls are 
frequently collapsed into the same category, they have dif-
ferent definitions and are largely carried out by different 
groups of people. While trolling might end up falling under 
the legal definition of harassment, it is not often motivated 
not by hatred and vitriol, but by a sort of nihilistic superior-
ity complex. True hatred—the wish to do someone harm—
and “lulz” are very different concepts, even though they 
may look similar to the uninitiated.
Another problem that is frequently encountered by those 
examining and discerning between these different forms of 
online hate is that the ways in which these boundaries are 
drawn largely depend on one’s positionality. Behaviors that 
may seem like “hate” to one group of people may seem like 
valid criticism to another.
Take, for example, the “hateblog” or “internet hate site” 
(Orsini, 2012) Get Off My Internets (GOMI). GOMI is a 
blog aimed at critiquing “egobloggers,” people who have 
built up a large following by chronicling the minutiae of their 
daily lives. GOMI has a large following; in 2013, Forbes 
named it a Top 100 Blog for Women.
GOMI’s editor feels that her site offers “a necessary ser-
vice to bloggers who’ve completely fallen out of touch with 
reality” (Orsini, 2012). Many of the posts focus on behaviors 
that the community finds grating or unethical: blatant con-
sumerism, entitlement, and “shady” business dealings. 
However, for the blog’s targets and their supporters, it comes 
across as vicious vigilantism: in the words of mommyblog-
ger Morgan Shanahan (2013), “While plenty of stories pub-
lished to GOMI roll off the backs of their subjects, others 
have contributed to legitimate damage on the lives and liveli-
hoods of those they seek to mock.”
The case of GOMI and its subjects is simply a case study 
of a larger conflict that is taking place on the Internet in gen-
eral, and that is a shift in normative values. A 2012 Atlantic 
Wire article bemoaned the encroaching “niceness” of the 
Internet, and pined for the days “when the internet was snarky, 
vicious, and brutal, a place for people to say things without 
fear of retribution, cloaked beneath the crude cloak of ano-
nymity” (Doll, 2012). The fact that the author Jen Doll thinks 
that those days of the Internet are past is another matter 
entirely, but her words belie the libertarian roots of the early 
web, the belief that all speech, no matter how vile or offen-
sive, is not only protected, but an essential part of what makes 
the Internet what it is. As the Declaration of the Independence 
of Cyberspace asserted, “we cannot separate the air that 
chokes from the air upon which wings beat” (Barlow, 1996).
This position, clearly one of privilege, can be seen echo-
ing through the #GamerGate controversy. Historically, both 
the gaming world and the Internet were the provinces of a 
particular type of geek masculinity that sprang from the 
male-dominated, rational-scientific environment of early 
technocultures (Kendall, 2002; Turner, 2010). As women, 
people of color, and people of varying levels of technical 
expertise assert their rights to participate and engage in these 
spaces on their own terms, we witness backlash from those 
most deeply entrenched in these communities.
When we consider the cyberlibertarian origins of the 
Internet as well as its military-educational history, the 
embedded culture underpinning the rise of sociality online 
would seem to indicate a sedimented dynamic of exclusion-
ary practices. It is equally enlightening to consider how the 
hate within a controversy such as #GamerGate functions 
beyond the platforms and spaces on which it operates.
Sam Srauy
At first glance, hate seems to arise from differences (Brewer, 
1999; Butler, 1990; Haythornthwaite, 2007; Kaynan, 2008; 
Torfing, 2003). When demarcated “ingroups” (e.g., gamer-
gaters) and “outgroups” (e.g., women and “social justice 
warriors”) mix with aggression online, the lack of face-to-
face social constraints allow for hate (Sproull & Kiesler, 
1985). However, differences do not necessarily precipitate 
hate (Brewer, 1999; Kaynan, 2008). The vitriol hurled over-
whelmingly at women throughout the #GamerGate ordeal 
seems to me to evince that hate may be power politics 
(O’Donnell, 2014), dependent on othering outgroups and 
believing in a zero-sum struggle—justified as a moral strug-
gle—against (perceived) threats. Brewer (1999) and Allport 
(as cited in Brewer, 1999) reasoned that demarcation is not 
enough; boundaries need something else to turn into hateful 
acts. In the #GamerGate ordeal, it was the belief that “the 
future of games” was a zero-sum contest (Hudson, 2014). It 
seems that what “social justice warriors” were saying was 
perceived as a threat through a zero-sum lens.
Zero-sum beliefs are necessary for hate (Brewer, 1999). 
Through this lens, the outgroup is seen as a threat (Kaynan, 
2008): “Whether actual or imagined, the perception that an 
outgroup constitutes a threat to ingroup interests [ . . . ] is 
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directly associated with fear and hostility toward the [ . . . ] 
outgroup” (Brewer, 1999, pp. 435-436). In other words, the 
perception of a threat is enough to march toward hate. 
Although what “social justice warriors” were saying would 
never threaten GamerGaters’ hegemonic dominance, the per-
ception was enough to spark outrage.
GamerGaters met this perceived threat with vitriol justified 
as moral superiority (Hudson, 2014). GamerGaters would not 
have us believe that women questioning their marginalization 
in video games elicited the hate. Instead, an appeal to “ethics” 
in games journalism was offered—including a debunked story 
about a female game developer (Quinn, 2014; Totilo, 2014). 
By asserting moral authority, hateful behavior toward out-
groups is claimed to be reasonable because it attempts to dis-
guise hate as a moral campaign against a perceived immoral 
threat (Brewer, 1999). In fact, undergirding all this hate is 
power politics. Strip away the claim of “journalistic ethics,” 
and what is left is a cultural project that pushes back in reac-
tion to positive developments in the past years (O’Donnell, 
2014; Omi & Winant, 1994). It is, in effect, the reaction of the 
ingroup’s perceived loss of power.
These responses engage with the complexities of staking 
out a conceptual framework for examining hate online, but 
also provide grounding for understanding the interplay 
between power, subjectivity, culture, space, technology, and 
history to begin any analysis of hating as a networked com-
municative practice. The next set of contributions builds on 
this unstable and complex foundation to address action, 
interventions, and regulation of hate online.
Affordances for Regulating Online Hate
Alison Harvey
How do we regulate hate online? So far, research summarizing 
the legal approaches to harassment, hate speech, and defama-
tion enacted on the Internet demonstrates that contemporary 
legal systems are ill-equipped to deal with these cases (Citron, 
2014; Franks, 2012; Marwick & Miller, 2014). Responses to 
the harassment of visible targets within the #GamerGate cam-
paign indicate that law enforcement is increasingly reactive to 
these online threats, though the challenge remains that the 
content of hate-filled messages must include some indication 
of a plan to action violence. This means that the threat of a 
school shooting at Utah State University if Anita Sarkeesian 
went forward with giving a talk on women in games was 
quickly addressed, as are increasing instances of “Swatting” 
#GamerGate targets with false calls to law enforcement. But 
only the most extreme instantiations of harassment, with 
bodily harm explicitly threatened or with the violation of other 
established felonies such as fabricated emergency calls, can be 
handled by the processes and protections of the legal system. 
The barrage of sexist, misogynistic, racist, anti-Semitic, 
homophobic, and transphobic hatred remains in unenforceable 
territory. This is further complicated by the ways in which hate 
online operates across borders, making the application of legal 
jurisdictions difficult if not impossible.
Hence, the significance of the structures and regulations 
implemented at the level of the platform itself, which brings 
us back to the historical and cultural contexts of the social 
media sites on which hate online operates. Targets of the 
hashtag campaign #GamerGate, including game designer 
Brianna Wu, loudly lobbied Twitter to address the time-con-
suming, complicated, and ultimately ineffectual tools at hand 
for reporting abuse and blocking accounts, particularly given 
the ease of creating new or multiple accounts even after oth-
ers have been removed (Brustein, 2014). Some of the reasons 
postulated for this failure to address the flow of hate speech 
have included the rationale that the “straight white men of 
tech” simply do not understand the nature of this harassment, 
as well as the standard free speech arguments about the open-
ness and neutrality of the platform. Twitter’s representatives 
have responded in the form of promises to work with organi-
zations such Women, Action, and the Media to tackle online 
harassment (Epstein, 2014), and, in the case of their CEO, 
apologies for self-admittedly inadequate action in light of 
persistent abuse (Tiku & Newton, 2015).
But are such responses anything other than cheap gestures 
toward corporate social responsibility from a social media 
company whose commodity is engagement and for whom 
campaigns of abuse and harassment can be understood as the 
creation of value? As Ben Kuchera (2014) observed in relation 
to the intimidation and harassment faced by marginalized 
users of the service before #GamerGate even began: “Twitter 
could fight this, of course, but the service won’t. The company 
is enjoying high revenues and a soaring stock price, but it has 
yet to own up to the fact that harassment is part of the product 
being offered.” The neutrality of this platform is thus only that 
which can be mobilized in service of capital. Hate—like sex—
sells, and that is not a problem when those who are hurt are 
those who have always suffered in capitalism. When the inten-
sification and expansion of hate online, as with #GamerGate, 
is revealed to be not a problem but a profitable development 
for those who manage the software and services designed to 
police online vitriol in light of legal limitations, we realize the 
extent to which alternative interventions are required. Thus 
far, though, the only interventions planned to mitigate this 
hatred appear to have emerged from those who have been tar-
geted, in the form of harassment support networks and advo-
cacy plans organized by Zoe Quinn (Hudson, 2015) and Anita 
Sarkeesian (Dredge, 2015). Can we expect only the marginal-
ized to create safe spaces free of hatred online?
Raising the question of responsibility for regulating online 
hate—of who should be responsible and how might interven-
tions take shape—evokes the counterpoint to thinking about 
rights online. Rights, to freedom of expression for example, 
also implicate responsibilities. Thinking further on the qual-
ity of these rights as incarnated in online versus offline 
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communication offers some ways into the complex problem 
of applying normative ethical frameworks developed in one 
context to another, as the next two posts indicate.
Tim Jordan
Our previous discussion suggests both a long history to hate, 
flaming, trolling, and other such speech online and that this 
hate is always part of politics. #GamerGate is clearly related 
to patriarchy and ways of degrading women to enforce exclu-
sions. Remedies relate to issues of freedom of speech, where 
boundaries are drawn, and the possible imposition of rigid 
understandings of things like trolling that are more complex. 
The complexity and the endemic nature of these kinds of 
exchanges that make up online hating and its history need 
addressing to understand regulation.
Earlier I suggested an understanding of hating based on 
the idea that online communicative practices have a different 
(but not separate) form to offline and that online form affects 
“existing” online. One has to be heard online because the 
style of someone’s online communication will have priority 
over the marker of identity on that communication—handle, 
email address, Twitter name, and so on. I tentatively sug-
gested the intensity of online hating may be because it also 
invokes the problem of simply existing online. If someone 
exists by being heard as a hater, then they exist by their style 
of hating and this underpins the intensity of hating. A related 
consequence is that if communicating online is part of exist-
ing online then the erasure of online existence is one of the 
potential consequences of hating; seen in the women driven 
to stop using Twitter (e.g., in the United Kingdom for run-
ning a campaign to have Jane Austen on a banknote) or to 
stop gaming and in both cases therefore to no longer be 
heard. A possible way to understand this connection between 
hating, communication, and online existence is by seeking 
inspiration from Haraway’s (2008) approach to the question 
of killing. This is not to diminish the powerful difference 
between killing in flesh and blood and nonexistence through 
not being heard online, but it is to take inspiration and to 
develop a question that we might apply to all domains in 
which we seek to ensure hating online does not help the 
ongoing creation of oppression and exploitation.
Haraway (2008) suggests that the absolute of “thou shalt 
not kill” does not reflect a world in which the intersection of 
bodies will, in the end, require killing of some sorts. She sug-
gests it may be a mistake “to pretend to live outside killing.” 
Instead, the issue is how to be responsible in relation to the 
question “what makes a being killable?” Haraway is not 
inciting killing but inciting responsibility in relation to a part 
of living that involves dying and doing so by drawing atten-
tion to the interwoven relations of beings, in which making a 
being killable must be understood and tied to broader social 
responsibility. In a similar way, perhaps we have to shift the 
debate about hating online from hating or not (particularly 
the dichotomy of free speech or not), to recognizing that 
within such communicative spaces disagreement and abuse 
are inevitable, but this should come with the ethical respon-
sibility for not allowing some beings to be made abusable to 
the point of not being heard.
This is only a starting point for a set of larger ethical 
dilemmas. It leaves open all the different answers to what 
would be a responsible approach to online discourse and 
what are the points of being not heard that are fundamental. 
But it at least shifts the debate from hate or not hate; it offers 
an approach that recognizes nuances and that these need 
understanding in their material settings, in their actual rela-
tions, while also asserting that we should not make anyone 
online un-hearable through abuse. Alison’s previous post 
poses, for me, a complex question; how to think about regu-
lating online hate without making the following three mis-
takes: devolving responsibility to those being abused (just 
ignore, do not go there, you do not have to read it); relying on 
companies and technologies (better filters, simpler appeal 
mechanisms); or, resorting to government intervention that 
also controls freedom of speech (2 years in jail for online 
abuse is now the penalty in the United Kingdom). Perhaps all 
three of these registers of dealing with online hate could be 
explored by asking, what in each of them makes someone 
abusable to the point of exclusion and so of nonexistence?
Sam Srauy
Tim’s response to Alison’s post, I believe, is at the heart of 
how we should think about online hate. Specifically, the 
“three mistakes” that Tim wants us to avoid forces us to 
ground our intervention in culture. If hate in general and 
events like #GamerGate specifically point to a counter move-
ment (O’Donnell, 2014; Omi & Winant, 1994) against wom-
en’s rights, then needed interventions must take shape at the 
level of culture. Of course, these events happen in online 
spaces. To that extent, I do not want to disregard the techno-
logical affordances of these spaces. But, it does not seem to 
me that the hate emerged from these spaces. Rather, it seems 
more appropriate to view this hate as structured in its presen-
tation by online spaces.
How do we prevent victim blaming for online hate? We 
must examine the role of culture and power. On one hand, it is 
a structural issue. Online spaces afford an easy and cheap plat-
form for speech regardless of whether or not that speech is 
malicious. It is often quite easy for us to identify the victims. 
Despite claims that #GamerGate was about journalistic ethics, 
clearly Zoe Quinn, Brianna Wu, and Anita Sarkeesian were 
among the central targets of the hate (Hudson, 2014; Quinn, 
2014; Sampat, 2014). Searches for the #GamerGate hashtag 
yield many veiled and not-so-veiled references to these 
women. On the other hand, it is a cultural issue. As the partici-
pation of women in the video game world becomes increas-
ingly normalized, there seems to be a backlash against their 
presence (O’Donnell, 2014). If we take #GamerGaters by their 
word, then #GamerGate was about ethics. However, examine 
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the effects and targets of #GamerGate, and it seems hard to 
conclude that it was anything other than a campaign of hate 
(Chess et al., 2014; Hudson, 2014). That is what was more dif-
ficult to see—that the campaign was a struggle over power and 
male privilege. Only by seeing it through the discourse of male 
privilege does it become clear why “journalistic ethics” could 
possibly mean doxxing or threatening the lives Quinn, Wu, 
and Sarkeesian (see Porter, 2015). It seems that the perceived 
zero-sum contest was the centrality of men as “true” gamers. 
With the increasing normalized presence of women in the 
games world, those who enjoyed privilege, it seems, felt 
threatened (see McIntosh, 2014). And, as Brewer (1999) 
argues, a belief in a zero-sum struggle is necessary for hate.
Culture is not the sole site of this contestation. No matter 
what, people have to interface with technology in the online 
world. The online world, after all, is a technological world. 
But, should we rely on technological, corporate, or legisla-
tive solutions? I am not sure. Clearly, making a claim (as I 
have here) that “fixing” online culture will do more to medi-
ate online hate faces the criticism that such a claim is too 
naive and, if it is even possible, too slow to make any real 
difference in victims’ lives today. I would agree with those 
criticisms. It would seem that some combination of techno-
logical, corporate policy, or legislative solutions is neces-
sary. Nevertheless, I believe that any of those solutions 
would be bandages unless we address the underlying culture 
of online spaces.
Clearly, pre-existing cultural norms play a constitutive 
role in the way that hating gets expressed online, as is evident 
in the case of #GamerGate that has served as the primary 
case study for this discussion. But what about online hating 
beyond this particular example, hating that expresses not 
only misogyny but racism, homophobia, ableism, and so on?
Tamara Shepherd
Building from Sam’s articulation of the cultural substrates 
for online hating, and Tim’s point about the space of online 
expression as intimately bound up with questions of voice 
and being heard, I want to shift our attention toward more 
pervasive everyday incarnations of hating online. These tend 
overwhelmingly to take place in the comments sections of 
websites, which were initially heralded as providing the 
space for interactivity that marked the web as somehow more 
democratic than older forms of mass media (Jarrett, 2008). 
The affordances of comments as potentially anonymous 
spaces to speak back to power of course also contained the 
possibility of replicating existing structures of power in even 
more vitriolic forms that served to in fact shut down debate 
and deny people’s ability to be heard.
For example, the anonymous comments sections of major 
global newspapers opened up in the mid-2000s have mostly 
since been restricted in response to an overwhelming array of 
racist, sexist, and otherwise hateful comments, especially on 
contentious political topics but even on relatively innocuous 
stories (Santana, 2014). In terms of regulation, newspapers 
struggled with how to deal with such comments—turning 
them off at a certain point, not archiving them, doing away 
with anonymity, or strictly moderating them—pointing to the 
difficulty in enacting top-down regulation on an online cul-
ture of commenting that manifests the supposed neutrality 
and openness of the web in the form of systemic exclusion as 
a kind of “ghost in the machine” (Hughey & Daniels, 2013). 
In this sense, the quandary for regulation has less to do with 
discouraging uncivil discourse and more to do with facing 
expressions of hate—or what Emma Jane (2014a, p. 559) has 
called “e-bile” in the context of online misogyny—“in its 
unexpurgated entirety because euphemisms and generic 
descriptors such as ‘offensive’ or ‘sexually explicit’ simply 
cannot convey the hostile and hyperbolic misogyny which 
gives gendered e-bile the distinctive semiotic flavour.”
The act of facing the semiotic power of online hating 
seems to be the crucial first challenge in approaching any 
kind of regulatory framework, in advance of making connec-
tions between online hate and offline legal understandings of 
harassment, stalking, abuse, defamation, and so on (e.g., 
Citron, 2014). Ways in which expressions of hate mean in 
online space seem to emanate from the cultural acceptance of 
hateful epithets as themselves constitutive of online interac-
tivity. Kylie Jarrett’s (2008) contention that “interactivity is 
evil” because of its contribution to capitalist inequality as a 
liberal value that produces governable, nonresistant neolib-
eral subjectivities also implicates similar inequalities at the 
level of cultural values and the ability to make oneself heard.
This all leads to the political-economic argument Alison 
alluded to about the potential profitability of online hating 
that supports supposedly unregulated online spaces for free-
dom of expression. For example, in discussing the expecta-
tions on Reddit’s incoming CEO Ellen Pao to potentially 
“clean up” the site, a Guardian article maps out the intercon-
nections between the “good” and “bad” Reddits in arguing 
that “cleaning up Reddit may only be possible as a side effect 
of cleaning up the world itself” (Hern & Bengtsson, 2015). 
And in fact, the site’s attempt in June 2015 to tighten up its 
regulation of hate speech sparked intense backlash from 
members of particularly inflammatory subreddits, revealing 
an intense vilification of Pao herself that precipitated her 
departure from the company after only 8 months. Yet, in the 
absence of legal or other kinds of regulatory recourse, pri-
vate filtering and reputation management companies profit 
from the individualization of risk entailed in protecting one-
self from online hating (Bartow, 2009). So the focus must 
shift away from whether regulation makes sense and toward 
how the discourse questioning regulation might open up an 
opportunity for the increasing encroachment of individual-
ized risk afforded by ignoring the violence enacted by online 
hating. In this respect, the issue of regulating hate online 
needs to take into account its ontological specificity within a 
particular moment of hegemonic Western liberal culture.
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Conclusion
As the exchanges within this roundtable discussion indicate, 
discussions of online hating are riven with conceptual com-
plexity. Attempts to define and historicize hate online, while 
also suggesting regulatory interventions, face issues of not 
only clarity but of implicating a broader value system that in 
some ways challenges liberal ideals that are so integral to 
popular investments in networked technologies and cultures. 
The moral underpinnings of such a challenge imply the need 
for new approaches to conceiving of liberty through culture, 
in order to move beyond utterances themselves to address 
structural inequalities. As Phillips (2015) concludes in her 
study of trolling, attempts to bring justice to Internet-
mediated hating subcultures tend to “mistake the symptom 
for the disease,” losing the complex interplays between 
power and language that carry a profound moral ambiguity 
within both hating and regulated speech.
Amartya Sen’s (2009) work might be instructive here as a 
corrective to John Rawls’ notion of justice (which relies heav-
ily on liberty), where Sen argues that justice ought to be 
thought of as degrees of fairness to all constituent stakehold-
ers. By taking this tack, Sen sees justice as a pragmatic 
endeavor that ought to shy away from both the abstract, ideal-
ist conception of justice and a institutionalist view of justice 
that relies on purely technological interventions to produce a 
just environment. Following this argument, fairness ought to 
be thought of as degrees of fairness to participants (Sen, 2009). 
In other words, Sen draws us away from the zero-sum thinking 
that provides such fertile ground for hate.
Of course, it should not be assumed that such a position 
enables an evasion of institutional change. Rather what Sen’s 
view does is allow us to make space for a cultural view of 
justice (fairness) that can be articulated in online interven-
tions that may still respect liberal ideas of speech. What con-
stitutes a “good” intervention in this model can be seen in 
how closely that intervention adheres to the Sanskrit concept 
of nyaya—or justice (or fairness or goodness) seen in its 
positive effects on society (Sen, 2009). Fair interventions 
would be based on more than abstract liberal concepts (such 
as free speech). Rather, fair interventions would be judged on 
how well those abstract concepts serve all people.
Focusing on what it means to make interventions in hate-
ful spaces belies the pressing need to map hating’s ontologi-
cal messiness in order to get down to the urgent business of 
pragmatically addressing the ways it works to exclude mar-
ginalized subjects. Because as we debate what online hate 
might be, where we might locate its precursors and linkages 
to discourse, culture, and technology, and how to engage with 
its elusive slipperiness in light of established forms of regula-
tion, real harm is being done. To return to the #GamerGate 
example, Brianna Wu pulled out of the game convention 
Penny Arcade Expo (PAX) East and Anita Sarkeesian from a 
public talk at Utah State University because of threats they 
received online, indicating the continuities between offline 
and online hate through embodied forms of violence. It would 
seem to be time to move from descriptive and explanatory 
accounts of hate online to a historically informed research 
agenda oriented toward concrete action for intervening in the 
increasingly unsafe spaces of social media.
Such a research agenda, as we envision it, would require 
at least three thematic anchors—inclusion/exclusion, mate-
rial cultures, and governance—all examined with an attun-
ement to historical lineages of online hating. The first 
theme of inclusion and exclusion as moving boundaries 
requires a research methodology capable of mapping spaces 
and moments where and when being heard (or not being 
heard) online intersects with particular political struggles. 
Being heard, as constitutive of entering online discourse as 
an agentic subject, might be positioned in this way as a 
boundary-making activity and should be connected to how 
such boundaries interface with longstanding struggles asso-
ciated with different forms of marginality. The second 
theme of material cultures is also implicated in this map-
ping, specifically as the work of delineating the conditions 
of possibility for expressions of hate, and within which 
online hating can serve to crystallize certain cultural norms. 
Invoking materiality in this way is not only about particular 
spaces and moments, but also about the online–offline rela-
tionship and embodied implications of online hating. These 
embodied implications are taken seriously in order to build 
up a case for the normative, interventionist element of the 
research agenda, the third theme of governance or regula-
tion. As discussed, purely legal formulations are important 
but not sufficient to account for the complex investments in 
online hating. As such, this component of future study 
needs to think more broadly about the incarnations of gov-
ernance from both top-down angles, such as site modera-
tion, as well as bottom-up perspectives, such as shifts in 
community norms.
While this proposed research agenda presents its own set 
of practical and conceptual challenges stemming from its 
breadth of scope, we feel that such a diffuse approach is nec-
essary given the field of inquiry. It can be particularly diffi-
cult to understand hateful expressions as forms of “emotional 
terrorism” (Wu, 2015), given that hate wears several differ-
ent cloaks online, including those of humor, play, and prin-
cipled critique—cloaks that have ample cause to be 
themselves protected. To return to the example of 
#GamerGate, its discussion threads on sites like Reddit, 
4chan, and 8chan often contain as many articulate critiques 
as rape threats. Evidently, the legitimization of certain design 
features, practices, norms, and behaviors within the Internet’s 
institutional origins and cultures of interaction affords a cer-
tain libertarian value system that enables hate. At the same 
time, these affordances, in tandem with the enduring mascu-
linist ethos of the Internet, allow for not only instances of 
hate speech but coordinated, collective movements of hate-
driven harassment, frequently against those who have been 
oppressed, subordinated, and silenced offline as well as in 
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networked cultures. In the context of such very real social 
threats from online hating, at a moment of rising right-wing 
sentiments at least in Western culture, a historically grounded, 
ethically oriented examination of online hating needs to 
inform the development of new strategies of intervention 
into hateful spaces.
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